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Photo courtesy of the interviewee
Geopolitical Assessments is an independent consultancy whose core business is to provide analysis and advice on international issues to various clients. The consultancy also initiates ideas which aim to assist with the development of government policies.
Specifically, Dr Rakisits is in the process of trying to establish a 2nd track, or possibly a 1½ track, strategic dialogue between Pakistan and Australia. The main objectives of such a dialogue would be to not only broaden bilateral relations but also to assist Pakistan deal with some of the very difficult challenges it is facing today and in the future.
Accordingly, his article "The Afghanistan – Pakistan Vortex" seeks to demonstrate the importance of Pakistan in the quest for peace in that region of the world.
Photo courtesy of the interviewee
Dr Claude Rakisits (1956) was born in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo and holds the Australian and Swiss nationality. He holds a PhD in Political Science and a B.A (Hons) in International Relations.
Mr. Rakisits is specialized in Pakistan and Africa and currently works as Adjunct Professor in International Relations at Webster University (Geneva).
He is also head of "Geopolitical Assessments", an independent consultancy whose core business is to provide analysis and advice on international issues:
The combined countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in particular, their common border area, must be one of the ‘hottest’ geo-political spots in the world today. And this should come as no surprise, as it is in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of western Pakistan that the leaders of al-Qaida and the Afghan Taliban fled to following their ouster from Afghanistan in 2001 and continue to threaten the Coalition forces (International Security Assistance Force – ISAF) in Afghanistan and prepare attacks against Western interests in other parts of the world. It is also the home of the Pakistani Taliban who have caused much trouble in FATA and the bordering areas of Pakistan for the inhabitants and the government. It is precisely because this tribal area has become such a volatile region that the US administration and other Western countries have begun to refer to this area as “AfPak” and have appointed ambassadors to focus specifically on developments in that region.
What was already a difficult situation in “AfPak” has now become critical as a result of the recent and very worrying developments in the western part of Pakistan. In brief, what has happened is that the Afghan Taliban militants have ‘contaminated’ the local population with their jihadist extremism and this has in turn spawned an indigenous Taliban movement in Pakistan. Being of the same ethnic group – Pushtun - as the Pakistanis, it was not difficult for the Afghan Taliban to indoctrinate the locals. Moreover, many of these locals had themselves been involved in fighting the Soviets in the 1980s as Western-backed ‘Mujahideen’. These Pakistani Taliban – a mixed bag of religious extremists, thugs, petty criminals and fellow travellers – have not only effectively taken over control of the whole tribal areas (about the size of Switzerland), but they have now spilled into the ‘settled’ (non-tribal) areas of western Pakistan. And until recently, when they spilled into the beautiful Swat Valley and surrounding districts, these Taliban fighters were only about 100 kilometres from Islamabad, the nation’s capital.
The Pakistani Taliban’s fast expanding area of control has been facilitated by a number of factors.
First, the previous government under General Musharraf cut several deals with them hoping to stop their advance. But instead of disarming and expelling their allies, the foreign militants which include al-Qaida, as they were meant to, they consolidated their positions and evicted the army from the tribal areas.
Second, the army did not have the will or the counter-insurgency skills or materiel to fight back. Instead, the poorly-trained army lost over 1500 men, became very demoralised, and gave up.
Third, America’s use of drones to target high value Afghan Taliban militants and al-Qaida leaders hiding in Pakistan’s tribal areas has caused scores of civilian deaths among Pakistanis. This has reinforced already strong anti-American sentiments among Pakistanis, making it even easier for the Taliban to recruit among an already disaffected and economically deprived population. It is important to remember that in terms of socio-economic standards, FATA is not only by far the worst-off area of Pakistan but due to a number of historical reasons it is also not politically integrated with the rest of the country. Put differently, FATA has been for all intents and purpose forgotten by the central government in Islamabad since 1947.
Fourth, the Pakistan government’s February 2009 agreement – now dead - to allow the Pakistani Taliban to implement Sharia law in the Swat valley confirmed in the eyes of many that the political leaders in Islamabad only believed in appeasement and did not care about the well-being of the local inhabitants. For months already the Pakistani Taliban had been burning girls’ schools, forcing the closure of barber and video shops and hanging people by lamp posts if they disagreed with their version of Islam. Accordingly, as the people were given no protection from the authorities - the military not being anywhere to be seen and the police force resigning en masse out of fear – had no choice but to abide by the harsh rule of the Pakistani Taliban. Of course, it is important to remember that it was only after the army had failed to subdue the militants after one year of military operations and only cause civilian casualties and physical destruction that the government agreed to this February deal.
However, the Pakistani Taliban’s fortunes have changed recently for a number of reasons.
First, the Pakistani Taliban broke their agreement with the government by not only failing to disarm as they were meant to do, but by continuing their advance eastward and spreading fear and destruction to neighbouring districts.
Second, this rapid and threatening advance eastward ever more closer to Islamabad caused all political parties and most importantly, the military, to realise that something had to be done to halt these militants whose objective was the overthrow of the government of Pakistan. However, even with this dire situation and notwithstanding a number of (unhelpful) alarmist assessments, the Pakistani state was not about to fall in the hands of the Taliban. The Pakistani Taliban, a disparate collection of jihadist groups without a unifying leader and little fire power, is no match for a 700,000 - strong Pakistani army.
Third, the US administration put enormous pressure on the Pakistani leaders, making clear that it expected the Pakistan army to roll these militants back and chase them all the way back into the tribal areas. Washington made clear that this would be a prerequisite for Pakistan to receive the economic and political aid it was seeking from the US.
Accordingly, the Pakistani army decided in April to confront the Pakistani militants and to not only stop their advance eastward but to push them back into FATA. By mid-June it had secured the Swat Valley and the surrounding districts of Dire and Buner by ousting the 8,000 or so Pakistani Taliban fighters (which included hundreds of foreign and al-Qaida fighters), killing well over 1,000 of them and capturing the major city of Mingora. It took almost two months and some 40,000 troops to do the job, with well over 100 soldiers killed in the clashes. This was an important battle the Pakistani army had to win to demonstrate its resolve and capability.
But victory came at a very heavy cost to the civilian population. Because the army is primarily trained and equipped to conduct conventional warfare, it used a very heavy-handed and inappropriate approach to fighting the insurgents. By using heavy artillery, helicopter gunships and fighter bombers, it wrecked havoc on towns and villages, killing many civilians and destroying a lot of private property and the little infrastructure that existed.
The military operation in Swat caused some two and half million people to flee and seek refuge elsewhere. This massive and sudden movement of people was the biggest the world had witnessed since the 1994 Rwandan genocide. About 80 per cent of these internally displaced people (IDP) have been accommodated with friends, families and even total strangers because the government of Pakistan was unprepared for this humanitarian disaster. And while there has been a public mood change in support of the government’s military campaign, this could very quickly change if the government fails to help rebuild what it destroyed and resettle the millions of IDPs quickly. Analysts estimate that the reconstruction could cost up to US$3 billion.
Given that Pakistani President Zardari’s government is already inherently weak due a number of inter- and intra-party disputes, a failing economy and a lack of clear government direction or leadership on major policy issues, it cannot afford to fail in its military campaign against the Pakistani Taliban. The next step – the battle for Waziristan – will be crucial for Pakistan’s future and the direction of the war in Afghanistan.
Even before ousting the Pakistani Taliban from Swat, the Pakistani army was under very heavy pressure from Washington to turn its attention to South Waziristan – the home base of the Pakistani Taliban as well as probably one of the most important safe havens for the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida. Accordingly, on 14 June 2009 the Pakistani government announced that a “comprehensive and decisive operation” would be launched to eliminate the Pakistani Taliban. But the forthcoming military clash in Waziristan will not be as easy as in Swat. As a matter of fact, it will be long, very difficult and nasty and costly in men and materiel. Already the Americans are ‘softening’ up the area with an increasing number of drone attacks against high value Taliban and al-Qaida commanders.
South Waziristan is very mountainous and rugged, with deep gorges and steep slopes, making it ideal insurgency country. There are no big settlements and towns like in Swat. As this is the Pakistani Taliban’s heartland, its militants will fight hard, and they will be doing so on home ground as opposed to Swat, where they were outsiders. They can expect a certain degree of support from the local population which will not look kindly at the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani army – seen as foreigners - coming in uninvited and inevitably bombing innocent civilians. And, as in Swat, the military operation will inevitably cause hundreds of thousands to flee the war zone to seek refuge elsewhere in Pakistan. This will further complicate the already grave humanitarian situation in western Pakistan where it is estimated there are some 3 million IDPs.
Complicating the task of defeating the Pakistani Taliban is the presence of the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida which will no doubt give military support to their ideological brothers-in-arm. Moreover, having moved into the area some eight years ago after having been ousted from Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida have had time to dig themselves in by building tunnels, hideouts and fortifications. They will be waiting for the Pakistani army.
They will all fight very hard: the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida to protect this very important launching area for attacks against Coalition forces across the border in Afghanistan and the Pakistani Taliban because losing Waziristan would be a fatal blow to their campaign to overthrow the Pakistani government. We can expect many more suicide bombings – now an almost daily occurrence - against state institutions (army bases, police stations, politicians) and innocent civilians across Pakistan in retaliation for the army’s military campaign.
The good news for the Pakistan government is that the Pakistani Taliban is divided. There are a number of Pushtun leaders (some of them on the Pakistani government’s payroll) who want to eliminate or replace Baitullah Mehsud, the current leader of the Pakistani Taliban. One of these opponents, Qari Zainuddin, was assassinated on 23 June 2009. No one claimed responsibility. But, even if Baitullah Mehsud (suspected of having organised the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2008) were eliminated or replaced as leader, it would not mean the end of the Pakistani Taliban threat. The government may try to exploit traditional tribal rivalry by giving military support to leaders of the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe. Such an approach could, in the long term, be dangerous and backfire, as tribal loyalties vis-à-vis the central government tend to be fluid.
But, even more important is the change of attitude of the Pakistani army. There is now a national consensus to oppose the Taliban (as opposed to under President Musharraf). Accordingly, the army is now determined to do the job that is required of them.
The outcome of the battle for Waziristan will have a critical impact on the current war in Afghanistan, and this is why the member countries of ISAF will be following very closely the course of the forthcoming battle in this tribal area.
The Afghanistan–Pakistan vortex 2 – The security situation in Afghanistan"
