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Leonhardt van Efferink is a PhD student at Royal Holloway, University of London. For more information about his PhD, please check:
Leonhardt van Efferink: Geopolitical scripts and the (de)legitimisation of ISAF
He holds Master’s degrees in Geopolitics, Territory and Security (King’s College London) and Financial Economics (Erasmus University Rotterdam).
This article addresses the role that democratisation can play in the settlement of ethnic conflicts. It starts with a discussion of the critical concepts: ethnicity, ethnic conflicts, democracy and democratisation. Then the paper continues with a discussion of the central question: what factors affect the effectiveness of democratisation in terms of the settlement of ethnic conflicts?
This is part 2 of the article that discusses six factors that affect the effectiveness of democratisation to settle ethnic conflicts. The first part discusses the definitions of the latter two concepts, while part 3 address six other relevant factors. Part 4 provides the conclusion, bibliography and endnotes of this article.
A first factor that influences the effectiveness of democratisation in terms of ethnic conflict settlement is the sequence of the process[1]. Dahl (1971, pp. 36-38 and 44) argues that an institutional framework needs to be in place before a full-fledged democracy can be implemented. In his view, such a framework is necessary to prevent political elites from applying nationalist discourses and execute discriminatory and divisionary policies to defend their power base.
Mansfield and Snyder (2007, pp. 10-11 and 16) argue as well that democratisation should proceed in a fixed order, but recommend the establishment of a national identity for the state before the development of institutions and the establishment of political parties. Lack of a state identity weakens the peace prospects of a democratising state as it gives ethnic leaders the opportunity to refer to group identities.
The actor(s) that take the initiative for democratisation affect the process as well. Samuel Huntingdon differentiates between three different kinds of democratisation processes[2]. A ‘transformation’ process occurs when the authoritarian regime initiates democratisation, usually when the regime is stronger than the opposition (at the outset of the process) and if moderate political forces are stronger than extremist ones. As a positive, ‘transformations’ are relatively well positioned to reduce ethnic conflict due to its gradual approach towards political liberalisation and the likely dominance of moderate forces among regime and opposition groups alike[3].
Huntingdon speaks of a ‘replacement’ process when the authoritarian regime has fallen apart; the opposition has assumed power and starts democratisation [4]. ‘Replacements’ do generally not bode well for the resolution of ethnic conflicts as the collapse of the regime could easily result in battle for influence among the opposition groups and puts involved parties under time pressure due to the power vacuum[5].
A ‘transplacement’ process takes place when the authoritarian regime and the opposition share the view that none can dominate the other (anymore) and they need each other to shape the political future of the country[6]. ‘Transplacements’ are relatively well able to reduce ethnic conflict as the opposition groups may benefit from being relatively experienced[7].
The third factor that has an impact on the ability of democratisation to settle ethnic conflict is the participation level of ethnic groups. Ideally, all involved groups need to be included in the negotiations and be willing to discuss and subsequently agree with a deal that is beneficial for all groups[8]. Finding a democratic system that is acceptable to all ethnic groups is nonetheless very difficult. Division of power among the groups involved in the conflict provides the government authority that is sanctioned by these parties[9].
However, a danger of democracy is that the largest ethnic group could use ‘majority rule’ to create a hegemonic position towards other ethnic groups[10]. This could happen in countries where ethnic conflict has resulted in political parties that are organised along ethnic lines[11]. Such parties heavily depend on the support of one ethnic group and represent the interests of this group. If the majority ethnic group dominates a democracy, other ethnic groups could develop feelings of exclusion and discrimination, losing their bond to the government and state institutions[12]. Groups that feel treated as second-class citizens could easily become the source of renewed ethnic conflict[13].
Another factor that is critical to the effects of democratisation is the effectiveness and efficiency of the government. Differently put, governance plays an essential in ending conflicts between human groups in the same country[14]. To foster governance, a government in a democratising country must create an institutional framework that forces the state to take consistent, rational and impartial decisions[15].
Effective and accountable institutions such as an independent judiciary agency and independent media are necessary if democratisation is to result in peace[16]. Perceptions of accountability among the local population can be stimulated by adapting governance systems to local customs[17].
Strongly related to governance is the crucial role of security in a democratising country, as explained by Simons (1997, pp. 273 and 277-278). She argues that democratisation is only possible when the population in a country feels confident about their long-term security and their room to choose their individual political identities. If these conditions are not met, democratisation could easily lead to ethnic conflict.
Simons also claims that when a government rules over a population without fostering equality among citizens in terms of security, political participation and expression of group identity, individuals are more likely to get involved in ethnic conflicts. She further stresses that it takes many years before a critical part of citizens starts regarding the national state capable of guaranteeing the security of the population. As long as this view has not materialised, people are inclined to rely on their ethnic group for security.
Finally, Simons argues that people require security in legal and material terms. When the state manages to offer these forms of security, people become able to develop individual political identities.
One of the most difficult factors to address in order to make democratisation a success is the presence of multiple ethnic identities in many countries. A strong attachment to group identities hampers the ability of a democratic system to resolve ethnic conflicts[18]. As a consequence, members of ethnic groups could easily explain compromises of their leaders with other ethnic groups as betrayal.
Moreover, a democratisation progress could raise ethnic tensions due to the persistently negative views of ethnic groups on the identity and past behaviour of other ethnic groups. These views could easily complicate the negotiations between ethnic groups during the democratisation process[19].
The first part of the article discusses the definitions of democratisation and ethnic conflicts. Parts 2 and 3 each address six relevant factors that are relevant for the usefulness of democratisation to settle ethnic conflicts. Part 4 provides the conclusion, bibliography and endnotes of this article.
