- RSS feed 
- Twitter 
After clicking with left mouse button on book cover, an Amazon page (or publisher's) with book info appears in a new browser window.
Photo courtesy of the interviewee
"La geopolitica anglosassone. Dalle origini ai nostri giorni", Guerini, 2009
Mr Bordonaro has a blog, where he writes about geopolitical trends and interesting publications:
Federico Bordonaro is associate professor at CESPU and Rome’s University "La Sapienza".
Geopolitical time is not easy to define. Since geopolitics is the dynamic relation that exists between, on the one hand, the pursuit of power by human groups and, on the other hand, geographic/technological settings, geopolitical time differs from political time, in that the former is measured in the medium-to-long term. As a consequence, geopolitically significant events are not necessarily the same events which grace the front pages of global media.
Geopolitical time becomes a clearer concept if we define geopolitical change. This occurs as new powerful political and economic centers arise, if new strategic routes emerge, or if already crucial routes and resource-rich places become militarily dominated by a new power or coalition of powers. Of course, geopolitical change takes time, and is more dependent upon a series of events than upon a single event.
For other views on 2009, please have a look at the other part of this article:
Various contributors: 2009 Geopolitical Review - trends, events and risks
We are, thus, talking about a flux of events which determine principal and secondary trends. The year 2009 has accelerated already existing geopolitical trends: the consolidation of Chinese influence in international diplomacy, Beijing’s pursuit of military might, Europe’s struggle with its lack of political-strategic cohesion, the US attempts to regain the upper hand in Afghanistan and to fight against its perceived loss of prestige, the growing hysteria about possible implications of allegedly man-made global warming. All such trends have continued in the context of a slow and difficult recovery from the deep economic crisis began in 2008.
Since geopolitics is always influenced by representations, I would say that 2009 witnessed a significant consolidation of the "G2" concept. Such geopolitical concept means that Chinese power and influence in economic, financial, military, and diplomatic affairs are rising to the point where Beijing can be a global partner of the US.
"G2" entails that the world system isn’t polarizing into a new kind of bipolar competition between China and the US, but it is instead evolving into an asymmetrical multipolarity, whereby Washington and Beijing, at times, may cooperate virtuously, and be therefore the leaders of a wider network, in which the E.U., Russia, Japan, India, Brazil, and possibly South Africa would participate in decision-making about global security issues. "G2" is therefore a geopolitical image which reflects an essentially optimist worldview.
The pessimist view about China’s rise is the one hold by scholars like John Mearsheimer. According to him, Beijing, as a rising regional hegemon, will inevitably clash with the US and its regional allies (Japan, Taiwan, South Corea and Australia). In order to predict whether US and China will be more cooperators or competitors, we have to look at geopolitically crucial nodes, like vital sea lanes of communication, basing, resource centers. Are Washington and Beijing able to re-organize the military control over such hot spots in a cooperative way? It is too early to give an answer, but that is a key variable to watch.
In 2009, the geopolitical position of the US didn’t progress much. Washington remains deeply involved in the Afghan context, notwithstanding the grandiose goal of installing a stable and durable democracy there seems to be unattainable. American military and political involvement in Iraq remains crucial for the country’s stability, a fact that does not help the fulfillment of Washington’s desire to withdraw its forces from the Arab country.
As a result, during 2009 Iran was able to continue with its defiant nuclear policy, as it calculated that the US was too strained by the Afghan and Iraqi contexts to be able to concentrate enough political-military strength against Tehran, and that Russia and China would keep on supporting Tehran’s game – although not enthusiastically. Such a context has increased the danger of a confrontation between the US-Israel side and Iran, even though the Obama administration has tried its best to keep negotiations alive, and it has also signaled Israel that the US is not ready to unconditionally support Israeli actions. However, the unresolved Iranian crisis is one of the worst legacies of 2009 for world security.
Another important geopolitical trend is Pakistan’s state crisis. Intense geopolitical pressure by the US-led coalition in Afghanistan, coupled by internal regionalism, religious extremism, and political bickering, are creating the conditions for Pakistan’s collapse, should the state enter a phase of severe fiscal crisis – a possibility that is made more likely by the recent economic recession.
Moreover, 2009 also registered a pause in Russia’s "grand return" as a geopolitical power in Europe, after the 2008 Georgia war. However, notwithstanding the financial crisis and Moscow’s internal political struggles, I’d say that Russia made important steps forward to realize its main energy policy goals in Europe, namely Nord Stream (Baltic gas pipeline) and South Stream (from Southern Russia and the Caspian basin to Austria via the Balkans).
The second project, as everyone knows, is probably a lethal competitor for the US and E.U.-backed Nabucco project. However, analysts and Western governments worry about Russia’s ageing gas pipelines network and about Gazprom’s inability to invest sufficiently in maintenance and enhancement of its extraction and transportation capacity. New energy crises are therefore looming, while Europe will likely augment its share of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) and renewable power. Nuclear power, as predicted, has enjoyed a revival (see Italy) and will probably continue to do so next year in several European countries.
A final word for the recent Copenhagen summit: while it is yet unproven that global warming depends significantly upon human activities, it is certain that some nations want to use climate policies to expand their influence and prestige in the international system (UK for instance).
Furthermore, climate change policy is predicated upon the assumption that the international system is progressing toward a more horizontal structure, a post-hegemonic or even post-polar structure in which international, multilateral cooperation prevails over state-centered foreign policy. The results of Copenhangen have dealt a serious blow to such a vision, as national calculations and the crucial role of the most important rising power, i.e. China, have proven to be a decisive factor.
Wrapping up, events in 2009 confirmed that power politics remains central even in a globalized world.
